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Abstract—Today’s ubiquitous computing ecosystem involves various kinds of hardware and software technologies for different comput- 
ing environments. As the result, computing systems can be seen as integrated system of hardware and software systems. Realizing such 
complex systems is crucial for providing safety, security, and maintenance. This is while the characterization of computing systems is not 
possible without a systematic procedure for enumerating different components and their structural/behavioral relationships. Architecture 
Reconstruction (AR) is a practice defined in the domain of software engineering for the realization of a specific software component. 
However, it is not applicable to a whole system (including HW/SW). Inspired by Symphony AR framework, we have proposed a 
generalized method to reconstruct the architecture of a computing platform at HW/SW boundary. In order to cover diverge set of existing 
HW/SW technologies, our method uses an ontology-based approach to handle these complexities. Due to the lack of a comprehensive 
accurate ontology in the literature, we have developed our own ontology -called PLATOnt- which is shown to be more effective by 
ONTOQA evaluation framework. We have used our AR method in two use case scenarios to reconstruct the architecture of ARM-based 
Trusted execution environment and a Raspberry-pi platform have extensive application in embedded systems and IoT devices. 
 
Index Terms—Ontology, Architecture reconstruction, Reverse engineering, Platform security. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
HE increasing complexity in hardware and software 
domains has resulted in an extensive complexity in 
computing systems. Use of a large number of SW/HW 
elements developed independently, multi-layered software 
stacks, huge system software with millions of lines of codes, 
motherboards with multiple chips having standalone pro- 
cessors, heterogeneous system architecture, emergence of 
new technological concepts (such as zones, fault domains, 
virtual sessions, isolated environments and etc.), the existing 
trend toward platform-based design [7], commodity chips 
and closed-source software blobs make most current com- 
puting devices even more sophisticated than before. 
Achieving a high-level view of the system’s component 
and their relationships -called the system’s architecture - is a 
crucial requirement for the maintenance phase of computing 
systems. It is also beneficial for effective use of existing re- 
sources for a specific application. More important, providing 
the desired security and trust to the platform is also not 
possible without deep characterization of the system. 
The need for discovering the architecture of a software 
application is an accepted topic in the software engineering 
domain and there are a plethora of techniques to reconstruct 
the architecture of a software application in the literature. 
These efforts have been also called architecture extraction 
[37], architecture recovery [25] [40], and reverse architecting 
[6]. Similarly, there are efforts in the field of hardware 
reverse engineering domain [15] [35]. 
Unfortunately, there is no well-known procedure for 
architecture extraction for a computing platform as a whole 
in the literature. We believe this is a missing link in the 
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context of computing system analysis without which 
other reverse-engineering efforts would fail to cover 
some aspects of the system at SW/HW boundaries. In 
other words, combining software architecture and 
hardware architecture views separately would miss some 
SW/HW relations which are critical for understanding 
the system. 
This HW/SW combined architecture reconstruction 
(AR) becomes more important when considering the 
close in- teraction between software and hardware 
components in today’s computing ecosystem. Motivated 
by the technology, these interactions have multiple 
origins: First is the trend toward softening the hardware 
components [43] which can be seen in programmable 
hardware chips, reconfiguration facilities, architecture-
aware compilers, and similar cases. Second is the trend 
toward implementing special computa- tions with high 
requirements of trust or computation power by the 
hardware. Hardware-assisted synchronization, vir- 
tualization, and security extensions are examples of the 
mentioned trend. As the result of this HW-SW coupling, 
one needs to consider the combinational architecture of 
hardware and software to realize the in-hand system. 
  It is worthy to note that in most cases component 
developers/manufactureres haven’t a such a holistic view 
about the architecture of different platforms in which 
their product may be used. Hence it wouldn’t be 
reasonable to trust the component developers about 
safety, security, and maintenance of the system. Instead, 
it should be possible for the user to analyze the in-hand 
system without full documentation and sources 
available. 
In this paper, we have proposed a method for architec- 
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context ontologies 
help agents to real 
ture reconstruction of computing platforms. We have used 
an ontology-based approach in order to handle diversity in 
different existing technologies. Ontology in the context of 
information science is defined as ”a highly structured system 
of concepts covering the processes, objects, and attributes of a 
domain in all of their pertinent complex relations, to the grain size 
determined by such considerations as the need of an application or 
computational complexity”[1]. We believe that ontology is an 
appropriate tool for knowledge management of computing 
platform domain. 
To this end, we have proposed a computing PLATform 
Ontology called PLATOnt. The ontology covers different 
hardware/software technologies exist in platforms with one 
of the four well-known CPU architectures (Intel/AMD x86, 
Intel/AMD x64, POWERPC, and ARM). Inspired by the 
Symphony software AR framework [44], we then have 
adapted the method to be applicable to computing plat- 
forms.Hence our contributions include: 
• Developing an ontology describing HW/SW com- 
ponents of a computing system -called PLATOnt-, 
which is evaluated by a domain-independent frame- 
work called OntoQA [42] to show its effectiveness 
compared to other existing ontologies regarding mul- 
tiple metrics regarding its classes, relations and in- 
stances. 
• Generalizing an existing software architecture recon- 
struction method to be applicable to a whole comput- 
ing system (having both HW/SW components). The 
method is then used in the conext of two use-cases to 
show its effectiveness for extracting the architecture 
of the ARM-based Trusted execution environment, as 
well as a Raspberry-pi platform. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: In section 
2 we have reviewed previous  research  literature  related  
to our work. Section 3 include explaination of our  main 
idea including PLATOnt development process and our AR 
method. In section 4 we have shown the effectiveness of our 
method in the context of two case-studies. Finally,  section  
5 and 6 have been dedicated to discussion and conclusion 
respectively. 
 
2 RELATED WORKS 
In this section we have briefly reviewed the existing efforts 
in the field of architecture reconstruction. Since we have pro- 
posed an ontology-based AR scheme, we have also enumer- 
ated the ontologies developed to describe computing plat- 
forms.  
 
2.1 Software architecture reconstruction 
Architecture reconstruction is a kind of reverse engineering 
effort in software engineering domain. While most of soft- 
ware AR efforts require the source-code, they may use other 
inputs such as run-time information [34], static information 
of application binary, or design artifacts. 
The practice may be done in a bottom-up  (architec-  
ture recovery) or top-down manner (architecture discovery) 
which either are supported by specific tools. In bottom-up 
tools ( .e.g. ARMIN [31], Rigi [21]) the analysis starts by an- 
alyzing the source code. The top-down approach however, 
begins by some abstract knowledge (about the requirements 
or architectural styles [11]) which is used to build a hypoth- 
esis. The source code is then used to verify the hypothe-    
sis [29]. Finally, hybrid approaches integrate both analysis 
techniques (.e.g. Symphony [22]). Nokia’s Symphony [22] is 
a view-driven software AR reference framework which is 
generalized by our method to be applicable to a system as a 
whole. 
There are surveys comparing some considerable soft- 
ware AR ideas. Nayyar and Shafique [29] tool-based survey 
and Ducasse and Pollet process-oriented taxonomy [11] are 
two examples of such surveys. 
 
2.2 Computing platform ontologies 
 While there has been no ontology-based AR effort in the lit- 
erature, developing ontologies to describe computing plat- 
forms is an approach can be found in several domains. 
Considering computing platforms as a part of context   
in which an intelligent agent operates, there are multiple 
[32] [19] [16] include a platform class to 
ize thei  hardware and software environ- ment. This 
ontology-based realization is then used to reason about, 
adapt to, and collaborate in their operational context. One 
of the most considerable efforts among such ontologies has 
been developed by Preuveneers et al. [32]. This ontology 
includes general information about hardware and software 
components of devices may be involved in an ambient in- 
telligent environment. 
Cloud computing is the second domain in which several 
platform ontologies have been developed for enabling better 
resource annotation [27], service discovery [47], configura- 
tion assessment [9], and domain comprehension [46]. While 
most of sub-classes used to describe platforms in these on- 
tologies are identical with non-cloud environments, there 
are also extra concentration on cloud service models (e.g. 
virtual appliance class [9]). 
Model-driven software architecture is another domain in 
which some platform ontologies have been proposed [45]. In 
this context, platform ontology helps to convert a platform- 
Independent Model (PIM) of an application to a platform 
specific one. 
  There are also multiple other domains which platform 
ontologies have been shown to be beneficial. As an example, 
Dibowski et al. [10] proposed a four layer ontology for 
hardware device description. The layers start with domain 
specific terminological approach and end with specific man- 
ufacturer vocabulary. This device description ontology is 
then used for formal design and commissioning of modern 
building automation systems. Another example is the mo- 
bile operating system ontology [17] has been developed by 
Hasni et al. by federating two single ontologies of Symbian 
and android operating systems.  
There are three main shortcomings in the above men- 
tioned ontologies. First is that they are so brief and are not 
able to cover many components of the system (.e.g. they do 
not cover buses and chipsets). Second, they have too coarse- 
grained view for those components they can cover. Third is 
that they are biased toward some well-known implementa- 
tions. As an example hypervisor is a platforms component 
always launched as a subclass of software class (like in [33]). 
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However, a hypervisor can be implemented by the firmware 
of a separated hardware chip (.e.g. POWER architecture), or 
inside the processor itself (.e.g. ARM monitor mode). 
Another related research topic includes abstract onto- 
logical discussions [26] [12] about hardware and software 
as two core concepts of platform ontologies. While Moors 
philosophical view [26] does not accept ontological distinc- 
tions between the two, Duncan [12] discusses how almost 
all well-known definitions of hardware and software have 
some kinds of shortcoming to reflect an ontological distinc- 
tion and presents a more exact definition of these two core 
concepts. 
 
3 ONTOLOGY-BASED ARCHITECTURE RECON- 
STRUCTION 
In this section, after proposing a brief motivation in section 
3.1, we will elaborate our developed ontology (section 3.2), 
and the proposed ontology-based AR method (section 3.3). 
 
3.1 Motivation 
When discussing the architecture of a specific software com- 
ponent of a computing platform, there are many software 
architecture analysis methods in the literature which enable 
the developer party to reconstruct and analyze the architec- 
ture of its product. These architecture analyses would help 
the developer to better provide maintainability, safety, and 
security in different phases of its life-cycle. 
When considering the big picture of the platform, there 
is a system of hardware and software systems which have 
been separately analyzed. However, the relationships of 
these components together can result in a new collective 
identitiy and cause some kinds of challenges which may 
haven’t been considered by a single developer party. 
In addition, sometimes there is a legacy system with 
no/less such up-to-date maintenance services. Hence it 
must be possible to realize how the system works as the  
first requirement for maintaining the system. 
System architecture reconstruction enables the end-user 
to find an abstract architectural view to a computing plat- 
form. Below we will enumerate some example questions 
which can be answered by such view. 
• How true is the claim of having an open-source boot 
firmware for this specific platform? Is it possible to 
develop a free code for a probable existing firmware 
blob? 
• How can the execution of a specific application get 
optimized in order to achieve better performance? Is 
there any more appropriate co-processor (.e.g. paral- 
lel co-processor) embedded in the platform for other 
purposes? Is there any choice other than the main 
memory to be used during the execution? How can 
these changes be applied to the execution environ- 
ment of the application? 
• How are the security and performance of the OS 
installed on this platform? To answer this question 
one should note that there is not a single well-known 
OS installed on the system. There are multiple stand- 
alone chips (.e.g. Security Co-processor, base-band 
modem, remote management engine, etc.) with their 
own OS inside the system. 
• Is there any OS-independent hardware access vector 
to the applications? 
Contrary to the popular belief, the above questions (and 
similar ones) cannot be easily answered. The primary step 
to answer the mentioned questions is to identify each of 
platform component correctly, whether that is implemented 
by hardware, firmware, or software. They should be then 
analyzed by a big picture containing the components and 
their relationship. This would be possible via architecture 
reconstruction method. 
 
3.2 PLATOnt ontology 
ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 [4] standard has defined the archi- 
tecture as the  fundamental concepts or properties of a system  
in its environment embodied in its elements, relationships, and   
in the principles of its design and evolution.  Hence  in  order   
to reconstruct the architecture, we require a knowledge 
management tool to help the user to discover these elements 
and relationships in a given platform. 
Considering the definition of ontology, we think it best 
fits for this aim.  An  ontology  consists of a set of concepts  
and relations between these concepts, describing their various 
features and attributes [8]. In continue we will elaborate on 
the development procedure of our ontology of computing 
platforms called PLATOnt. 
3.2.1 requirements 
The first requirement is that PLATOnt should have the abil- 
ity to generalize various existing technologies with diverse 
set of names to achieve their main functional concepts.  
This generalization may occur between technologies which 
primarily look fundamentally different. As an example ex- 
isting ontologies defined operating system and hypervisor 
as two separated classes (concepts). This scheme is the result 
of the poor realization of system software concept which 
covers not only OS and hypervisor but also many types of 
codes run independent of the two (e.g. ARM SVC monitor 
code). Another type of the generalization occurs when sim- 
ilar functions have different HW/SW implementation. As 
an example in the existing ontologies a firmware Trusted 
Platform Module (fTPM) [36] cannot be modeled as they 
consider only hardware resources. This is while the ability to 
involve fTPM-based secure boot is required during platform 
security analysis. 
The second requirement is that the ontology shouldn’t 
have a bias on well-known architectures (.e.g. x86) which 
exist in almost all of the existing ontologies. 
Finally, the third requirement is that PLATOnt should di- 
vide a commercial platform to the components in a manner 
which can be repeated by the end-user. Hence it should not 
rely on HW/SW source codes or similar artifacts which are 
not always available. At the same time, it should be able to 
use such knowledge resources if available. 
3.2.2 Methodology 
In this section we will describe our methodology to achieve 
PLATOnt. Multiple ontology building methodologies have 
been proposed for different domains. We have followed 
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Fig. 1. Application of Noy-McGuinness ontology development method 
[30] for PLATOnt. 
 
 
the ontology development process proposed by Noy and 
McGuinness [30] as a well-known domain-independent 
method. Figure 1 shows the required steps and their ap- 
plication in the case of PLATOnt development. 
The first step is to determine the domain and scope of the 
ontology. We have limited our ontology to computing sys- 
tems having five general purpose CPU architectures. These 
architectures are Intel/AMD X86 and X86-64, POWERPC, 
and ARM. Different software developed for these hardware 
architectures have been also considered inside the domain 
of the ontology. 
We should then find and reuse probable existing on- 
tologies. We have looked for such ontologies in different 
domains. As was mentioned in section 2, there are few 
platform ontologies in the literature with few classes (less 
than 20 classes) highly biased for X86 systems. So there were 
few reusable cases available. 
The next step is to enumerate important terms. Most    
of the vocabularies used in the context of a platform are 
specific to a CPU architecture (which in turn affect other 
consistent HW/SW components). Extracting terminology of 
an architecture is not as easy as it looks. Our first effort was 
to use a text analysis application to automatically extract  
the related terminology for each hardware architecture. We 
have tried Tropes [3] terminology extraction option and 
applied it to the raw text of mentioned CPU manuals. 
However, we weren’t successful since the terminology built 
by the software include a huge set of words which were 
mostly instructions, registers and their compositions1. As 
an example, only one of the volumes of Intel architecture 
 
1. As an example cmpicmpi8 is an instance term extracted from POW- 
ERPC manual. 
manual produced more than 10000 terms which the majority 
was not usable to our ontology. 
We believe that the reason for this failure is in the 
characteristics of current CPU documentations. Considering 
the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA), micro-architecture, 
and system design as three main disciplines of computer ar- 
chitecture [41], CPU documentations often address the first 
and second items. In fact, system design is not explained 
explicitly in any document and is expected to be realized 
within ISA explanations. 
In addition, any CPU architecture can host different sys- 
tem software (including operating systems, and hypervisor), 
or can be placed on different motherboards with different 
devices and firmware. These all compelled us to manually 
extract HW/SW keywords for our target platforms. 
At the next effort, we have tried to manually extract the 
terminologies. In order to ensure the finding of important 
terms we have used tens of papers on the topic of low-level 
attacks to the target architecture in addition to the official 
manuals. The attack background described in such kinds   
of papers include architecture specific terminologies which 
augment our initial findings. Similar effort has been per- 
formed to extract key terms from the documentation of op- 
erating systems and hypervisor products of each architec- 
ture. 
The achieved set of words were mostly architec- 
ture/manufacturer specific and one needs to deeply analyze 
their functional characteristics to achieve their core concept. 
This was done through the third and main step which is     
to define the classes and the class hierarchy. Classes have 
been defined in a bottom-up manner. Generalizing concepts 
shared between different keywords, the core concepts have 
been set as an ancestor and more specific concepts became 
their sub-classes. 
After defining the classes, we should define the proper- 
ties and relationships. Hierarchical relationships (Is a) are 
the most common relationship which exists between classes 
and their sub-classes. However, the more well-defined other 
kinds of relationship are defined in the ontology, the more 
informative the ontology will be compared to a simple 
taxonomy. 2. 
In practice, since different kinds of non-hierarchical re- 
lationships between the components form different archi- 
tectures, it is not possible to pre-define all relationships 
between classes and the user is asked to use the relations   
to describe the target system. 
Finally, after the mentioned steps we should place in- 
stances under their regarding classes. Instances are those 
manufacture-specific keywords we have extracted in the 
second step. 
 
3.2.3 Ontology 
The final ontology is developed in the OWL format by 
Protege ontology editor [28]. The ontology has seven main 
super classes and set of three types of properties. In con- 
tinue, we will briefly describe these main entities. 
 
2. In theory, properties can have restrictions called facets. Though  
we have defined facets, we think they are not much applicable in the 
current version of PLATOnt. 
x86 & x64 (Intel and AMD),POWERPC, ARM 
as well as supported software technologies. 
Determining    
domain and scope 
Identifying different domains in 
which platform  ontologies  have 
been developed (refer to section 2.2). 
Considering reuse of        
existing ontologies 
 
 
 
Enumerating 
important terms 
An empirical study of official docu- 
mentation, reverse engineering efforts, 
and research papers to manually extract 
the terminology of each architecture. 
Bottom-up procedure: Deep analysis of 
architecture-specific terms to be able to generalize 
similar concepts. 84 classes were defined. 
Identifying class    
and class hierarchies 
General properties which are informative 
about all classes are defined: implementation 
type, source status, and trust status. 
Defining class slots         
Creating instances 
Instances are defined based on pri- 
mary terminology found in step 2. 
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Fig. 2. System software class of the PLATOnt ontology. Bold Leaves are individuals for each class. 
 
- User-level software: Considering different types of 
operating systems and application architecture we have de- 
fined seven types of user-level code including libraries ( .e.g. 
Windows DLL), user-level drivers, run-time environments, 
interpreters (.e.g. JVM) , virtual machines (.e.g. VMware 
workstation), application frameworks (.e.g. Carbon, Cocoa 
in OS X), and finally the applications. 
- System software: This class includes codes which are 
run with higher privileges (ring/mode/level) of the CPU. 
There are various kinds of components we have considered 
under the system software class (figure 2): 
• Operating systems are the first subclass. We have 
considered either different types of OSs as well as 
different sub-components of an OS in the PLATOnt. 
PLATOnt classify operating systems as the main 
CPUs OS or stand-alone chip’s OS (e.g. base-band 
OS, TPM OS, Intel ME Minix OS or etc.). Today’s 
modern operating systems have more complex soft- 
ware architecture which can be reflected in the ontol- 
ogy for further architectural analysis (e.g. Android  
or Mac OS X). Hence we have defined different 
components of an OS too. These components may be 
the kernel, microkernel (.e.g. Mach in OS X), Kernel 
drivers, and different types of kernel interfaces. 
• Virtual machine monitors (.e.g. XEN), virtual buses 
and devices. 
• Some types of system software components are im- 
plemented by firmware. Examples include firmware 
devices (.e.g. fTPM [36]) and option ROMs3. In addi- 
tion CPU specific firmware components are another 
important kinds of system software. 
• Trusted Execution Environments components: To- 
day’s platforms can support different kinds of TEEs. 
The software for these TEE environments have been 
enumerated under this class. 
-Boot components: There are various types of system 
components involved in boot process. Other than the main 
3. Option-ROMs belong to the system devices which are often loaded 
into main memory and executed by the CPU 
boot firmware, there are next stage bootloaders with differ- 
ent functionalities such as hardware initialization, security, 
multi-boot, and diagnosis. Considering to utilities for pro- 
viding a chain of trust, there is also a pre-authenticated code 
which works as the trusted primary component of the chain. 
-Processors: processors are the next main class which 
covers the central processing unit (CPU) as well as other 
processors which are used in today’s platforms. This in- 
cludes device controllers and co-processors (.e.g. GPU , 
security co-processor). It is worthy to note that processors 
are not essentially hardware implemented. There may be 
logical processors supported by the CPU, or in virtual 
devices installed on the software stack. 
-Connectors, devices, and debug facilities: There are 
many types of connectors in a platform. Chipsets, bridges, 
hubs, and physical buses are examples of hardware connec- 
tors. Different devices and debug facilities are defined as 
separated classes. Considering virtual environments, these 
facilities can be implemented by software as well. 
Unlike all of the existing ontologies which use hardware 
and software as two main super-classes, we  have  found  
out these are implementation-related properties of compo- 
nents rather than the basic ontological concept. As stated  
by Tanenbaum [41], ”hardware and software are logically 
equivalent” and ”operation performed by software can also 
be built directly into the hardware and any instruction 
executed by the hardware can also be simulated by the 
software”. A comprehensive discussion in [12] shows that   
it is hard to find an acceptable distinction criterion between 
hardware and software. 
Softening the hardware components can be realized in 
the context of technologies like virtualization, reconfigu- 
ration, FPGA fabrics which are discussed in [43]. In the 
opposite direction, hardening some software components 
may be done to increase the computation power or trust- 
ability which is observable in hardware synchronizations 
(.e.g. hardware transactional memories), hardware-assisted 
security solutions (.e.g. TPM), and hardware virtualization 
CPU extensions. 
As the result, PLATOnt includes different types of plat- 
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PLATOnt’s Relations 
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Debug Dispatch Modification Physical relation Context switch Include Connect Execution processor Execution location Shared by Partitioned to Storage location Initialize Interpret Load 
 
  
Configuration modification Data modification Privileged instructions      User-level 
instructions 
Physical signals 
 
 
Fig. 3. General relations defined by PLATOnt between platform’s components. 
 
form components each have some general properties in- 
cluding implementation type (Hardware 4, software, or 
firmware), source status (closed, open, hybrid), and trust 
status (trusted, untrusted). 
Due to space limitation, the full ontology cannot be 
placed within the paper. The OWL version of the ontology  
as well as its SVG visualizaion would be available on the 
PLATOnt webpage [5]. 
The classes can be found in almost all of platforms with 
different names. However, their properties and their rela- 
tions differ between platforms. We have classified different 
relations exist between components into three following 
classes (Figure 3): 
1) Control relations: Some components of the platform 
are designed to be able to  have  some  controls  
over some others. This control operation may in- 
clude configuration, debugging, modification, or differ- 
ent kinds of execution redirection (.e.g. interrupting, 
call-gating, and etc.). Sometimes the physical posi- 
tion of a component makes it possible to have some 
controls over other devices which it mediates the 
flow of information to them (physical man-in-the- 
middle). 
2) Sequential relations: These relations indicate situ- 
ations in which a component has some kinds of 
privilege because it can access some data belong to 
another component after/before the owner. These 
include load or initialization of the component, or 
interpreting some instructions the component cannot 
execute solely. 
3) Implementation relations: There are some relations 
between component which regards to implementa- 
tion of the platform. System resources may be shared 
by some consumer components, or may be parti- 
tioned to separated parts. Executable codes are stored 
in a storage medium, loaded by a loader component 
to a memory component and then are executed by a 
processor. 
 
3.2.4 Ontology Evaluation 
In this section, we have evaluated the PLATOnt based on 
ONTOQA framework [42]. The framework is a domain- 
independent evaluation scheme and can be applied to any 
ontology. The scheme includes ten metrics regarding differ- 
ent aspects of the ontology (classes, relations, and instances). 
 
4. When discussing hardware components we distinguish between 
ICs and SoCs (System on Chip). 
Since ONTOQA can be used to compare two ontolo- 
gies, we have also calculated the metrics for the platform 
ontology have been proposed by Preuveneers et al. [33] 
which was the largest ontology on computing platforms 
mentioned before in section 2. This was done automatically 
by giving the OWL codes of the ontologies to the ONTOQA 
open-source application. 
Table 1 shows the metrics and their corresponding 
values. ONTOQA framework provides a weight for each 
metric, in order to indicate its importance. By considering 
these weights, a total score (weighted summation) can be 
assigned to each ontology which is more insightful for 
comparing different ontologies in the same domain. As the 
table suggests, number of defined classes, different types   
of non-hierarchical relationships, number of instances, and 
the average number of subclasses are the most important 
metrics that have caused a considerable increase in the 
PLATOnts score. 
 
3.3 Architecture reconstruction 
Inspired by Symphony software architecture reconstruction 
framework [44], our architecture reconstruction method in- 
cludes  three  main  steps  by  a  same  extract abstract 
present approach. Figure 4 shows these steps which are 
 
 
Fig. 4. Symphony-inspired ontology-based system architecture recon- 
struction. 
 
elaborated in the following subsections. 
 
3.3.1 Data Gathering (extract) 
In this step, the available artifacts for the platform should 
be deeply analyzed to recover architectural concepts (plat- 
form’s elements, different kinds of communication mecha- 
nisms and relationships exist in the system). 
Source 
views 
Data 
gathering 
official docs, 
reverse 
engineering 
Repository 
Component and Target 
connector views views 
Boot view, 
DMA view, 
cache view, 
... 
PLATont 
ontology 
Target 
views 
Ontological 
mapping 
Knowledge 
Inference 
Source 
views 
Information 
Interpretation 
 8 
 
 
TABLE 1 
ONTOQA metrics [42] used to evaluate PLATont and their values(* values were not available in the reference paper.). 
 
     
Metric Definition Weight PLATOnt Preuveneers 
    et 
    al.[18] 
Class count Number of defined entities 0.10 84 17 
Relationship count Number of defined relationships 0.07 33 3 
Relationship richness Non inheritance relationships divided by the total number of 0.08 28.44 18.75 
 relationships    
Inheritance richness The average number of subclasses per class 0.08 4.15 3.25 
Average Class Height The average height of classes 0.06 2.45 3.17 
Attribute richness Average number of attributes(slots) per class. 0.03 0 0 
Tree balance * * 1.94 1.3 
Individual count Number of defined instances 0.08 107 0 
Class Richness The ratio of the number of non-empty classes (classes with in- 0.03 71.42 0 
 stances) divided by the total number of classes defined in the    
 ontology schema    
Class Instance Coverage * * 1.63 0 
Average population The number of instances of relationship in the KB compared to * 1.27 0 
 the total number of property instances in the KB.    
Total score   24.16 3.86 
 
AR can be performed at different levels of abstraction. 
The granularity of analysis should be such that it covers all 
available information to the end-user. The user is asked to 
find any execution unit inside the system regardless of its 
implementation type (software, firmware or hardware). For 
software and firmware components, the independently de- 
veloped codes would be considered as separated execution 
units. For the hardware, any known subsystem which can be 
considered as a separated block with a specific functionality 
would be an execution unit (whether it is a separated IC or 
within a SoC). 
This is important specially when having a system which 
its hardware has been designed by platform-based method- 
ologies. This is because such meeting-in-the-middle designs - 
which are common approaches in embedded system design- 
result in more complex internal blocks each have their own 
processor, memory and etc. 
At the first level of inspection, the components on main 
board of the system are identified. A general block diagram 
of hardware components is often exist in the manual of the 
board. Further search is required about IC numbers found 
in the previous step to continue the component inspection 
in a recursive manner. In this phase, different processors, 
controllers which may exist inside ICs, their capabilities, 
operational modes, interrupt types, hardware extensions, 
and similar information should be documented  or tagged 
as unknown partitions. In the end, we expect to have nested 
diagrams of components which recursively build the main 
block-diagram of the system. After identifying hardware 
components, similar effort should be conformed to inspect 
software components of the system. 
Since the goal of this phase is to gather as much data    
as possible about the system, lexical analysis can also be 
beneficial. Looking for some golden keywords help the 
analyzer to extract different components and relationships 
exist in the platform. Boot sequence, processor operating 
modes, transparent execution, and privilege levels are ex- 
amples of such golden keywords. In any inspection step, if 
the intended information cannot be achieved it should be 
tagged as unknown and the inspection will continue in its 
next phases. 
The data gathered in this phase form a source view of the 
platform. It should be noted that the architectural analysis 
has different views in software and hardware contexts. In 
the hardware context, architecture often involves a struc- 
tural view, this is while behavioral views are more preva- 
lent in the software context. When considering different 
inter-component relations at hardware-software boundary, 
in addition to the structural view, there are some relations 
at HW/SW boundary which forms some systems behavior. 
For example, consider the relation of an operating system 
with CPU and memory. The OS is loaded into the memory 
and is executed by the CPU. When considering multiple 
software execution units, there are also such behavioral 
relations between components. 
 
3.3.2 Knowledge Inference (abstract) 
As it is shown in figure 4, in this step the achieved source 
view about the platform should be converted to a desired 
target view. 
Each target view reflects the system architecture from 
the  perspective  of  a  related  set  of  concerns  [20].  While 
[24] exist for software AR efforts, our 
tic   viewpoint   which   considers either 
hardware and software components sometimes referred to 
as components and connector, process, or execution view in the 
software architecture literature. 
Choosing such a reference viewpoint, custom viewpoints 
 
 
to be available for different analysis purposes. 
In the Symphony software AR framework ”the mapping 
rules and domain knowledge are used to define a map between the 
source and target view” [44]. Unlike Symphony, the mapping 
from the available source view (any kind of documentation 
can be derived based on the specific goal of the reconstruc- 
tion. Boot view (.i.e. reconstructing HW/SW components 
involved in the boot procedure) and DMA view (.i.e. re- 
constructing components involved in direct memory access 
operations) are examples of such views. Inspired by Sym- 
phony, these views are extracted and stored in a repository 
standard  viewpoints 
method   has   a holis 
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1: procedure ONTOLOGY-BASED MAPPING PROCEDURE 
2: Input: Source view, PLATOnt ontology, the desired target view 
3: Output: Component and connection view (probably partial) 
Systems Modeling Language (SysML) [14] is another 
choice which is an extension to UML software modeling 
4: for all classes (C ) in PLATOnt 
d Find probably overlooked components 
do language. It has added 9 new types of diagrams to UML in 
5: if no entity E exists with same a concept with C then 
6: Review documents to find a probable instantiation of C. 
7: end if 
8: end for d Find mapping for key words found in Data gathering phase 
9: for all entities (E) in source view do 
10: if E exists in PLATOnt instances (I) then 
11: Component(E) = P LAT OntC lass(I) 
12: else if C exists in PLATOnt classes with same concept as E then: 
then 
13: Component(E) = C 
14: else 
15: Update the PLATOnt. 
16: end if 
17: end for 
order to reduce its software-centric restrictions such that it 
can be used for modeling systems. 
We will show how can this architecture reconstruction 
can be applied through two case studies. 
 
4 ARCHITECTURE RECONSTRUCTION METHODOL- 
OGY EVALUATION 
In this section, we have shown the effectiveness of our pro- 
posed method through two case studies. The first case tar- 
18: for all found Components do 
d Find connections 
gets the reconstruction of ARM Trusted Execution Environ- 
19:  Define relevant connections with other components from PLATOnt 
relations. 
20: end for 
d Check which components are involved in the target view 
21: for all found Components do 
22: if Component is involved in the functionality of the desired view 
ment (TEE) [13]. This recovered architecture is then used in 
the context of AR of a Raspberry-pi single board computer 
platform.  
then 
23: 
 
Add 
 
Component’s 
 
connections 
 
which are related to the 4.1 Partial architecture reconstruction 
Output components to Output connections . 
24: Add Component to the Output components. 
25: end if 
26: end for 
27: end procedure 
 
algorithm 1: Pseudo code for ontology-based mapping pro- 
cedure. 
 
  achieved from the previous step) is not rule-based in our 
method. Here we use an ontology-based mapping scheme. 
Algorithm 1 shows the psuedocode for this ontology- 
based mapping which is performed manually. The analyzer 
is asked to use the PLATOnt  ontology to make sure that    
all components of the platform have been identified. After 
this pre-processing phase, PLATOnt relations are used to 
connect the identified components. 
Due to the complexity of the extract-abstract process, the 
user may require to return back to data gathering artifacts to 
find individuals for some classes/relations which were not 
considered before. 
 
3.3.3 Information Interpretation (present) 
Finally, the target view provides by the method should be 
used to provide an analytical report for the reconstruction 
stakeholder, such that it can be used to solve the initial prob- 
lem. 
As it will be shown in section 5, the initial problem can be 
proposed in different domain, including free software devel- 
opment, maintainability, execution optimization, forensics, 
and security. 
The architecture should be also visualized in this phase. 
This visualization is an important evidence attached to the 
final report which is the main outcome of this phase. 
One choice is to use a layered view of the system. 
Though useful, layered diagrams cannot show various types 
of relationship between component. In addition, almost all 
of the existing platforms do not have a fully layered archi- 
tecture. The use of such representation ignore those relations 
violate the layered scheme. More important, layered scheme 
does not match the components and connection view of our 
method. 
Architecture reconstruction can be used for reconstructing  
a special part of a computing platform. In this case, the 
analyzer is asked to follow the method to obtain partial ar- 
chitecture of the system including all components and their 
relationships which are involved for the target functionality. 
Partial realization can be beneficial to compare different 
technologies with a same functionality as well as similar 
systems with partial difference. 
In this section we have focused on the reconstructing  
the architecture of ARM TEE [13] available in millions of 
devices. In addition, it is used by AMD secure technology 
and Intel Management engine SoCs. 
ARM-based TEE AR is performed based on the ARM 
official documentations for ARM Cortex-A (64bit). Cortex- 
A family of ARM cores includes application processors 
equipped with TrustZone security extension. In practice, 
this basic specification will have some changes in ARM- 
based chips manufactured by different OEMs. 
In a Tustzone-enabled ARM platform, hardware re- 
sources are designed to support two separated execution 
environments -called secure and normal worlds- for run- 
ning untrusted and trusted executables independently. The 
critical code executes on the secure world which the normal 
application can communicate with. 
Data gathering phase is done by collecting official doc- 
umentation as well as different ARM-based attacks and de- 
fenses proposed in the academic literature. The later include 
over 180 papers which could help us to better understand 
the architecture. Knowledge inference phase was done by 
the help of PLATOnt and we have found 32 components 
involved in ARM-based TEE. Table 2 shows how our re- 
construction method models different facilities involved in 
an ARM-based TEE and mapping found elements to the 
PLATOnt classes. 
The security context of the processor cores (secure and 
normal worlds) is modeled by two set of virtual cores. This 
is because according to the official documentation, ”Each 
physical processor core provides two virtual cores. one con- 
sidered non-secure and the other secure, plus a mechanism 
to robustly context switch between them” [2]. As the table 
suggests, we have used two separated components belong 
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TABLE 2 
Description of how the method reconstructs TrustZone-Aware (TZA) elements. 
 
Type Platform property Mapping to PLATOnt classes 
 
Resources 
TZA RAM/ROM/Flash storage 
TZA L2 cache 
Two separated memory device components partitioning the main device. 
Two separate set of cache components sharing lines of main cache component. 
 
 
processor 
Processor security contexts 
CP15SDISABLE input signals 
Interrupt requests (FIQ/IRQ) 
 
Monitor mode 
Hype mode 
Two set of virtual cores . 
lock-down node as a system software component with modification access to the CPU. 
Two separated system software components for the interrupt handler codes with their own interrupt 
controller which normally deliver the interrupts to the monitor code. 
system software component with context switch access to the CPU. 
system software component which interprets privileged instructions of the normal world’s OS. 
 
to the two set of virtual cores executing the software stack 
dedicated for each world (running in a time-sliced fashion). 
Memory components (ROM/RAM) are partitioned to two 
separated parts for each security contexts. Hence we have 
modeled them by adding these pairs as new compo- nents. 
The L2 cache is handled in a different manner which does 
not follow partitioned layout. In fact, the cache lines are 
shared by the two security contexts and are tagged by a 
NS bit indicating the context which the data belongs to. 
It is worthy to note that unlike the memory, secure world 
context is not allowed to access lines belong to the normal 
world. We have dedicated two set of separated components 
for different memory types of worlds. 
Trustzone TEE can be integrated also with traditional 
system virtualization (in its normal world). Hype mode is    
a separated CPU mode supports trap-and-emulate required 
for virtualization in the non-secure security context. This 
mode is modeled by a Hype code component which inter- 
prets privileged instructions of the normal OS. 
Another ARM CPU mode is the secure monitor mode. 
There is a trusted monitor (executes on this mode) code 
which is executed in the context of secure world and is 
responsible for context switching the processor between two 
worlds. Calling the Secure Monitor Code (SMC), a privi- 
leged system software can request for the context switch to 
secure world. The monitor is also the original code can trap 
different interrupts. ARM architecture has defined fast inter- 
rupts (FIQ) as well as normal IRQs which are recommended 
to be deployed for separating interrupts of the two worlds. 
These interrupts are delivered to the ARM core by Trust 
Zone Interrupt controller (TZIC) SoC which includes two 
separate interrupt controllers shown in figure 5. Interrupts 
are then handled by the monitor (or the system software 
components which the monitor delegates the handler). 
A less discussed configuration facility in ARM architec- 
ture is the lock down mechanism. According to the official 
documentation ”Systems that want an additional level of pro- 
tection can use a signal input into the processor core to lock-down 
some of the critical Secure world configuration options in CP15”. 
To this end, the CP15SDISABLE processor input signal 
should be configured at boot time ”before passing control to 
the Normal world software” [2]. We have also mentioned this 
option in the reconstructed architecture by a component for 
indicating lock down configuration code. 
In the third step, we have visualized the reconstructed 
architecture ( Figure 5) to be applicable for different inter- 
pretation contexts. 
The achieved component and connection view can be 
 
 
zone extension inherently has been developed to provide 
hardware-assisted isolation, we have interpreted the recov- 
ered architecture from the isolation point of view. 
As the figures suggest, most of the involved compo- 
nents can be disparted into two secure and normal contexts 
(shown by gray and white nodes). Despite, there are some 
lines between the two contexts. Hence, without accurate 
characterization of the communication between these iso- 
lated contexts, efforts for the use of ARM TEE may fail and 
provide a legitimate exploitation path for an attacker. 
Considering the secure world as the more privileged 
context, one can classify the cross world edges into  two 
sets: privileged to normal, and normal to privileged. Lock 
down code’s ability to change the normal worlds access 
rights, context switch of the normal world’s virtual cores, 
and modification access of secure world executables to the 
memory dedicated to the normal world are edges include in 
the former set. An accurate study of such edges is critical to 
evaluate the security of the provided TEE. 
As an example, secure world software stack has the mod- 
ification access to the memory partitions dedicated for nor- 
mal worlds. This is while the cache lines do not follow the 
same rule and normal world lines are not accessible through 
the secure world. This is what was exploited by cachekit 
[48] rootkit which hides a malicious program  resides  in 
the normal world’s cache from any monitor/forensic tool 
running in both worlds. 
The other set of probable cross world edges which 
should be analyzed are those in reverse direction. Since the 
TEE designers assume the lower privilege of the normal 
world, it is expected that the system has no such edge. 
Although there have been some SMC call vulnerabilities [39] 
[38] which allows an attacker to access the secure world’s 
memory. These modifications, however, are not architec- 
turally defined in the system and made possible by the 
insecure implementation of monitor code. 
 
4.2 Whole system architecture reconstruction 
In this section, we have shown how our architecture recon- 
struction method is applicable to a specific platform as a 
whole. We have chosen Raspberry-Pi (model A) system as 
the target which is used by many embedded devices. 
 
4.2.1 Data Gathering and knowledge inference 
In the first phase (data gathering) we have started with 
Raspberry-pi official documentations and extracted few  
HW components: Broadcom BCM2835 (CPU & GPU), 
256/512MB SDRAM, USB/Ethernet/HDMI/Audio ports, analyzed through different points of views. Since the Trust- 
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Fig. 5. ARM Trustzone-based TEE architecture 
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SD Card Slot, and the GPIO. We  then have gone forward   
by the practices mentioned in section 3.3.1. We have tried  
to find documentations belong to each of the components 
by finding their part number or  exact  chip  name.  Since 
the main part of the functionalities is embedded inside the 
proprietary BCM2835, we have tried to find out as much as 
possible about the SoC. In the case of SW components, we 
have found different existing software codes applicable to 
Raspberry-pi including boot utilities, hypervisor, and etc. 
Next, we have used PLATOnt in the knowledge inference 
phase. To this end, we have tried to map each concept exist 
in the ontology to a found keyword from the Raspberry-pi. 
This makes it more straightforward procedure of documen- 
tation analysis. 
A more challenging task was to find the relations exist 
between the components. The master-slave relation between 
Videocore GPU and the ARM processor has added more 
complex relations between components. There are multiple 
communication mechanisms between ARM and Videocore. 
Providing a shared memory space is the first one which can 
be used for zero-copy operations. The second mechanism   
is to use interrupts. Since these processors use a shared 
memory on a physical bus, the GPU (master) should be able 
to interrupt the operation on the ARM when needed. 
4.2.2 Information interpretation 
We have used SysML graphical language to represent the 
architecture by the desired component and connection view. 
We have made the complete diagram (which includes 50 
components densely connected to each other) on our web- 
page [5]. 
The architecture indicates the Raspberry Pi platform is 
not as simple as it may look in the first glance. There are 
more than 6 processors, three different operating systems5, 
more than four stages of bootloaders, and binary blobs 
inside this popular platform. 
There are multiple viewpoints which can be derived 
from the reference achieved view. Table 3 shows some of 
these viewpoints and a brief output report considering a 
specific concern by the architectural view. 
 
5 DISCUSSION 
Providing an ontology of computing platforms can be ben- 
eficial in multiple applications. In general, such an on- 
tology can augment existing subject classification systems 
like ACM Computing Classification System (CCS) [1] or 
Mathematics Subject Classification (MSC). 
 
5. We  have assumed the memory card to use 8051 RAM controller.  
If an ARM-based memory is used there would be one/two other 
operating systems in the Raspberry platform. 
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TABLE 3 
Information interpretation phase applied to Raspberry-pi AR 
 
Initial problem Target view Brief Interpretation 
 
Free bootloader development Boot view Three primary boot components run on the GPU (proprietary processor instructions) and then three components execute on the ARM 
processor. These components have been stored in different storage components and have different execution locations (ROM, Cache-as- 
RAM, RAM). Developing code for each stage requires accurate study of tasks should done by that specific stage, the ISA for its execution 
processor, and a (HW/SW) mechanism to update the storage media. 
Boot security Boot view Starting the boot sequence by the GPU instead of the ARM application processor, will make it more difficult for a malicious application 
(bootkits) to inject a stealth code into either secure and normal security contexts. In fact, the GPU can be a more secure location for 
positioning monitor code for checking the boot sequence. Reverse engineering efforts have made it possible to run arbitrary code on the  
GPU. Despite, such a monitor would be vulnerable to possible attack vectors against the less known closed-source GPU processor (Which   
has its own Minix-based OS and Alphamosaic processor). 
Optimizing deep learning applica- 
tion execution on Raspberry (GPU 
programming) 
GPU view The GPU consists a Vector Processing Unit (VPU), the DMA engine, and 3D pipeline. A Quad Processing Unit (QPU) is in the heart of the    
3D pipeline which can execute parallel computations. The VPU (a Dual core Alphamosaic processor) offloads OpenGL commands when 
executing applications running on the ARM. However, the VPU’s 3D pipeline is fed by a hardware manner and commands are executed        
by the QPU. Hence the more knowledge about the QPU position in the system architecture, the more parallelization would be possible by 
providing accurate compilers. 
Memory forensic tool development memory 
view 
A single SDRAM is partitioned multiple times ( .e.g. GPU/CPU, ARM secure/normal world, and kernel/user partitions) and there are 
different components of the system with their specific access rights to some of these partitions. Memory addresses are translated via multi- 
stage procedure. Hence it is important to consider which partition is accessible via the location in which the tool for dumping the memory     
is located? By considering the shared SDRAM between GPU and the ARM, one should consider the effectiveness of the TEE protections 
supported by the Trustzone in this architecture. The original access control mechanism applied by the ARM on the two RAM sections 
dedicated to the two security contexts cannot prevent the GPU access to the secure world RAM. Hence the question is about whether or not 
another mechanism defined by the Broadcom in order to protect RAM section dedicated to the secure world? and how much such probable 
protection is effective. Without answering the question, the TEE facility of the ARM processor looks to be futile in the Raspberry architecture. 
Cache side channel attacks cache view While the ARM CPU and the Videocore GPU share most of system resources (internal ROM, SDRAM, and the storage), The L2 cache is only 
used by the GPU in the default setting (for better performance). The ARM processor, however, can enable sharing of the cache. The outcome 
of this cache sharing should then be inspected more accurate against different cache attacks. 
 
It should be noted that our method aims to help the  
user to handle the complexity of different technologies in    
a given system and reflect platform’s component based on 
declaration of the manufacturer of the components. Hence 
it is not expected to be able to indicate probable hard- 
ware/software implants. In fact our method is a procedure 
to analyze the platform’s inherent architecture. This would 
be beneficial when comparing different architectures, best 
use of embedded resources, alternating platform’s binary 
blobs, locating best platform points for security products, 
and similar applications. 
The input information required for our method may be 
achieved by official documentations, reverse engineering ef- 
forts, open architecture usage. In its ideal form, augmented 
ISA contract [18] [23] can result in richer input and output 
result of the proposed method. 
Although PLATOnt has been tried to cover as much plat- 
forms as possible, it is hard to guarantee its completeness at 
any given time. The most updated version will be available 
on the PLATOnt web page [5] for further analysis by the 
community. 
Another point is that the electronic chips with no soft 
code (.e.g. CMOS backup battery, CPU fan) are not consid- 
ered in PLATOnt deliberately. That’s because they do not 
contain any programmable part. 
There are more systematic choices for interpretation step 
for architecture construction. Use of architecture description 
languages (ADLs) can be a choice. However, most of the 
existing ADLs cansnot cover HW and SW components 
simultaneously. In addition, they are developed for a custom 
goal which cannot simply used for other purposes. AADL    
is a standard language with HW/SW coverage which can   
be also extended to include the PLATOnt concepts. Hence 
we are going to implement the PLATOnt by AADL in the 
future. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have proposed an ontology-based method 
for platform architecture reconstruction. Our method is in- 
spired by Symphony [44] software architecture reconstruc- 
tion framework and is an effort toward adapting Symphony 
to be applicable for a whole system. 
Due to the insufficient ontological approaches exist in 
the context of computing platforms, we have developed 
PLATOnt ontology by using the Noy-McGuinness ontology 
development methodology [30]. Using metrics proposed in 
ONTOQA [42] we have evaluated the classes, relations and 
instances of our ontology and compared the results with an 
existing ontology to show our contribution. 
We then have shown how can our method be used to 
reconstruct the architecture of ARM Trutzone-based TEE 
(partial architecture) as well as a Raspberry-pi platform 
(whole system architecture) as two case-studies. 
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